Is regulatory quality related to industry performance? Evidence on telecommunications, gas and electricity in EU15 by Ugur, Mehmet
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is regulatory quality related to industry
performance? Evidence on
telecommunications, gas and electricity
in EU15
Mehmet Ugur
University of Greenwich
July 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31365/
MPRA Paper No. 31365, posted 9. June 2011 12:54 UTC
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is regulatory quality related to industry performance? 
Evidence on telecommunications, gas and electricity in EU15* 
 
Mehmet Ugur 
Jean Monnet Reader in European Political Economy 
University of Greenwich Business School 
M.Ugur@gre.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality 
and the relationship between those indicators and market performance in liberalised EU-15 
network industries. We report a low level of regulatory independence and competence, a high 
level of cross-country variations in regulatory quality, and a prevalent absence of correlation 
between ex ante regulatory quality and ex post performance indicators. On the basis of these 
findings, we suggest that the design of national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe is not 
optimal and may be conducive to regulatory ineffectiveness or outright regulatory failure. 
Nevertheless, the existence and strengthening of EU-level regulators could enable EU 
member states to reduce the risk of regulatory failure by encouraging coordination and 
adoption of best practice.  
 
KEY WORDS: Economics of Regulation, European Public Policy, Regulatory Quality, 
European Network Industries. 
 
* The final version of this paper is published as ‘Regulatory quality and performance in EU 
Network Industries: Evidence on telecommunications, gas and electricity’, Journal of Public 
Policy, Vol. 29, no. 3 (December 2009), pp 347-370.  
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Introduction  
 
Over the last decade or so, EU network industries have been subject to liberalisation reforms 
and regulation. The timing and extent of liberalisation have differed between sectors and 
across member states; and so has the strength and competence of national regulatory agencies 
(NRAs). In spite of these variations, some students of European regulation point to the 
emergence of a ‘European order’ of network industry regulation, the main characteristics of 
which are: (i) progressive market opening that allows for free entry of suppliers and consumer 
switching between suppliers; (ii) increasing transparency through unbundling of production, 
transmission and retail supply activities; and (iii) establishment of independent NRAs 
complemented by EU-level regulatory bodies (Napolitano, 2005).  
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the quality of the emerging European regulatory regime, 
which consists of the heads or representatives of NRAs and representatives of the EU 
Commission, in EU-15 telecommunications, gas, and electricity markets. We begin with a 
review of the existing literature on the political economy of regulation and factors that may 
reduce the risk of regulatory failure. Then, in section 2, we examine the ex ante indicators of 
regulatory quality in EU network industries. The aim here is to provide some evidence on ex 
ante indicators of regulatory quality and whether there is consistency between these indicators. 
In section 3, we look at some ex post performance indicators such as market structure, prices, 
and consumer switching. The aim here is to ascertain the extent to which the NRAs have been 
effective in influencing supplier behaviour and market structures. Finally, the conclusion will 
bring together the main findings and elaborate on the scope for improving the quality of the 
European regulatory framework.  
 
1.  The political economy of network industry regulation  
 
Network industry regulation is a public policy problem, the resolution of which is 
complicated by information asymmetries, transaction costs, agency problems, and strategic 
interaction between multiple actors such as consumers, suppliers, regulators, and governments. 
Information asymmetries and transaction costs combine to generate incomplete contracts 
between these actors. Incomplete contracts, in turn, may lead to sub-optimal regulatory 
outcomes that emerge either as inadequate or as excessive regulation.  
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The objective theory of regulation addresses the question as to how transaction costs, 
information asymmetries and principal-agent problems (i.e., the constraints) may lead to 
regulatory failures. (See, Berry, 1982; Estache and Martimort, 1999; Dal Bo, 2006.) Earlier 
work in this tradition tended to focus on regulator’s endowment or membership size of the 
regulated group as determinants of regulatory quality. In the commission inadequacy 
approach, which dates back to 1930s, inadequate resources and/or expertise tend to prevent 
the regulator from reducing the excessive rents that the regulated firm derives (Frankfurter, 
1930; Trachsel, 1950). Students of the group approach, on the other hand, argue that the 
regulator would tend to protect the interest of the regulated industry because the 
large/diffused group of consumers would fail to organise whereas the small group of 
regulated firms would organise effectively and influence regulatory outcomes (Bernstein, 
1955; Olson, 1965; Wilson, 1974; Berry, 1982).  
 
These pessimistic findings drew further support from studies in which the regulator (equated 
with the government or the legislator) is modelled as a strategic player trying to maximise its 
own objective function (mainly the chance of re-election). For example, Stigler (1971) 
demonstrates that regulation will be excessive and will increase the ability of regulated firms 
to extract excessive rents through restricted competition.  Peltzman (1976) refines Stigler’s 
model, but arrives at a similar conclusion: regulation will typically entail less than optimal 
protection for consumers, but its protection of producer interests will be less pervasive than 
what the Stigler-type models predict.  
 
This type of modelling acknowledges that regulators have their own objective functions, but it 
says very little about how they realise their objectives. To address this shortcoming, Tirole 
(1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) analyse the regulatory process as a two-stage game 
between the government, the regulator, and the regulated firm. In stage one; the firm has 
private information about its cost, which is not yet known to the regulator or government. The 
government appoints a regulator, whose powers are specified via a second-best contract that 
enables it to increase its knowledge of the firm’s true cost structure. The second-best contract 
reduces but does not eliminate the rents for the firms. In stage two, the firm offers the 
regulator a side-contract (i.e., some kind of bribe) before the latter decides how much of the 
cost information it should pass on to the government. If the regulator takes the firm’s offer, 
the latter continues to extract rents that it now shares with the regulator. If the regulator 
declines, then no rents remain. The problem for the government (i.e., the principal) is then to 
offer the regulator a contract that will induce him not to lie about the firm’s cost structure and 
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to offer the firm a regulatory regime that will provide the latter with rents that are just enough 
to prevent it from colluding with the regulator (Dal Bo, 2006: 207).  
The difficulty in resolving this regulatory problem is confirmed in a large number of 
empirical studies on network industries. For example, Upadhyaya and Raymond (1994), who 
use cross-sectional US data for 1922, 1927 and 1932, report that the US regulatory regime 
was unsuccessful in lowering state-level electricity prices below monopoly levels. There are 
similar findings from time-series US data too. For example, Upadhyaya and Mixon (1995) 
use national US time-series data for 1918-53 and report that regulation was not a statistically 
significant determinant of prices in that period. Finally, Mitra et al (2005) also report that the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Orders of 1996 
did not lead to production or cost efficiency in the US electricity market between 1983-1999. 
 
Despite these pessimistic findings, it is difficult to make a case against regulation of network 
industries, where market power remains a significant issue. Instead, one can make a case to 
treat regulation as a necessary but not sufficient condition for reducing the distortions that 
arise from market power. Identifying the sufficient conditions and providing institutional 
design solutions are issues within the realm of the normative theory of regulation, which 
examines the institutional arrangements that may enable the policy maker to reduce the risk of 
regulatory failure. For this purpose, Estache and Martimort (1999) provide an extensive list of 
contractual design characteristics that could minimise the risk of sub-optimal regulation. 
These are summarized in Table 1 and include the following: (i) independence and autonomy 
of the regulator vis-à-vis the regulated industry and the political principal; (ii) multiple 
regulators with complementary competences; (iii) accountability of the regulator; (iv) quality 
and availability of information about regulatory outcomes; (v) availability of industry-specific 
information to be shared between regulators; and (vi) anti-collusion measures applicable to 
current and future relations between the regulator and the regulated industry.  
 
(Table 1 here). 
 
One contractual/institutional design characteristic that may reduce the risk of regulatory 
failure is independence. Independent regulators are more likely to deliver efficient ex post 
outcomes because they can help resolving the conflict between credible commitments and ex 
post efficiency. Given that any regulatory contract is essentially incomplete due to 
information asymmetries and agency problems, it would be more efficient to allow for re-
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negotiations of the regulatory contract. If periodic changes in the regulatory contract are 
undertaken by the government who also control the regulator, it will be less feasible to 
distinguish between changes introduced for political convenience and those introduced with a 
view to improve the regulatory contract on the basis of new and relevant information. Once 
this confusion arises, the regulated industry will question the credibility of the regulatory 
standards and will increase its lobbying activities aimed at inducing the government to change 
the regulatory requirements.  
 
However, if the regulator is independent the regulated industry will have less incentive to 
lobby the government for change. This is because the rates of return on lobbying will fall 
either because the independent regulator is likely to resist government pressure or the 
government will be able to deflect the lobby pressure on the ground that the independent 
regulator has different information that contradicts the private information of the firm. The 
end result will be that the regulatory contract will remain credible between reviews and the 
latter will incrementally improve the quality of the contract over time. This combination will 
increase the probability of securing optimal ex post outcomes in terms of efficiency and 
welfare.  
 
Another contractual design characteristic that increases the probability of optimal ex post 
outcomes is the existence of multiple regulators with complementary competences. This 
characteristic may minimise the risk of regulatory failure for two reasons. First, 
complementarity - i.e., absence of overlapping competences – minimises the scope for 
regulated firms to ‘shop’ between regulatory jurisdictions with a view to choose the most 
lenient regulator. Secondly, regulators with complementary powers set the level of regulation 
in their area of competence without having to take into account the standards set by other 
regulators. In other words, the regulators are not motivated to dilute their regulatory 
toughness with a view to secure the loyalty of the regulated firms. (See Laffont and Martimort, 
1999).  
 
 
2.  Ex ante indicators of regulatory quality in EU network industries 
 
The institutional/contractual design characteristics discussed above should be considered as 
relevant only for assessment of ex ante regulatory quality – and not as determinants of ex post 
regulatory outcomes with respect to prices or investment or service quality. However, it is 
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possible to establish a theoretical link between the ex ante indicators of regulatory quality and 
ex post outcomes, and to empirically test if the existing evidence supports or refutes the 
theorised link. Therefore, in what follows, we first assess the ex ante indicators of regulatory 
quality in EU-15 network industries and then we examine the extent to which these quality 
indicators have had the expected effects on ex post performance in regulated markets. This is 
necessary not only to avoid hasty generalisations about the quality of regulatory outcomes but 
also to increase the tractability of the findings.  
 
 
2.1 Co-existence of EU and national regulatory bodies 
 
One ex ante characteristic of the emerging European regulatory regime is the co-existence of 
both national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and EU-level regulatory bodies such as ERG 
(The European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications) and ERGEG (The 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas). This co-existence tends to satisfy the 
condition of complementary in two ways. First, it could legitimise the incorporation of any 
EU-level rules or agreements into national regulatory policies. As a result of the potential 
convergence that would follow, firms would find it more difficult to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage by moving between jurisdictions. Secondly, the newly established EU regulatory 
bodies such as ERG or ERGEG derive their legitimacy from the high level of professional 
expertise concentrated in critical areas of the national regulatory domains and in cross-border 
issues that arise from the nature of the emerging single European market for network 
industries. Finally, EU-level regulatory bodies are formally incorporated into the 
supranational rule development and enforcement of the Commission. Indeed, the Commission 
refers frequently to the reports and recommendations of ERG and ERGEG in its proposals for 
new directives or regulations aimed at increasing competition and strengthening the 
regulatory framework in network industries (Eberlein and Newman, 2008). 
 
Writing on EU-level regulatory bodies that precede the network industry regulators such as 
ERG and ERGEG,  Majone (2000, 2002) reports that EU-level regulatory bodies tended to act 
as central nodes that encourage efficient cooperation, coordination and adoption of best 
practice among national and sub-national regulatory agencies. Majone (2002) indicates that 
the effectiveness of these ‘first-generation’ European regulators depended on three conditions: 
(i) high levels of mutual trust and cooperation between agencies; (ii) high levels of 
professionalism; and (iii) a common regulatory philosophy. Yet, there is no agreement on 
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whether the first-generation European regulators have been designed in a way that satisfies 
these conditions. For example, Coen and Doyle (2000) indicate that EU-level legislation 
provides only for a regulatory framework, leaving detailed legislation to be adopted at the 
national level.  In addition, European liberalisation and regulatory reforms tend to result from 
sub-optimal compromises determined by bargaining between member states, between the 
latter and the commission, and between the member states and regulated industries. (See, 
Heritier, 2001). In other words, the positive effect of EU-level regulatory bodies on the 
quality of national regulation cannot be taken for granted. Although the they may reduce the 
risk a ‘drive to the bottom’ in terms of regulatory toughness, they may not necessarily lead to 
diffusion of best practice due to factors related to the process of EU policy making - e.g., 
bargaining, multiplicity of political actors, issue linkage, etc.  
 
Recent work on the second generation of EU-level regulatory bodies including ERGEG 
provides similar findings. For example, Eberlein and Newman (2008: 36) identify factors 
similar to those identified by Majone (2002) and argue that ‘professional homogeneity’, the 
degree of ‘delegated authority’ and ‘administrative capacity’ are the determinants of the 
differences in the ability of national and EU-level regulators to perform effective regulation. 
Their findings on ERGEG suggest that the latter has made key contributions to the 
development of the internal energy market. One such contribution was the codification of its 
policy proposals into the European Commission’s third legislative package of 2006 for further 
liberalisation and regulation of the electricity and gas markets. Secondly, ERGEG’s opinions 
and recommendations have been referred to as blueprints for best practice by the Council and 
the Parliament. Yet, ‘lack of full independence from government and insufficient powers’ 
limit the effectiveness of national enforcement by NRAs, leading to ‘regulatory asymmetry 
between national jurisdictions’ (Eberlein and Newman, 2008: 44). 
 
On the basis of these findings and my reading of ERG and ERGEG achievements after 2004, 
it is possible to argue that the emerging EU-level regulators of network industries are a step in 
the right direction. This is mainly because they have been effective in limiting the scope for 
downward convergence in EU regulatory standards. Stated differently, ERG and ERGEG 
have been instrumental in preventing a drive to the bottom in terms of regulatory norms and 
have strengthened the hand of the European Commission in its bargaining with national 
governments. However, both ERG and ERGEG are still far from being able to ensure upward 
convergence in EU network industry regulation. In fact, they are due to be superseded by new 
EU-level regulatory agencies – as envisaged in the third reform package of the European 
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Commission for electricity and gas, and in the fifth reform package for electronic 
communications. The third package for electricity and gas was approved by the European 
Parliament in September 2007 and is expected to be endorsed by the Council by December 
2009. The fifth package concerning electronic communications is yet to be debated by the 
European Parliament and the Council. Unlike ERG and ERGEG, the future EU-level 
regulatory agencies will be funded through the EU budget and will be empowered to take 
binding decisions. However, their competence is likely to remain limited to cross-border 
issues, excluding other areas of regulation concerning prices, investment, and intra-country 
concentration.   
 
2.2 Regulatory competence and independence  
 
Two other ex ante regulatory quality indicators are independence and competence. Regulatory 
independence is necessary to resolve the government’s commitment problem and address 
problem of resource/expertise adequacy. Regulatory competence, on the other hand, is 
necessary to ensure that relevant market outcomes such as prices, environmental standards, 
investment or universal service are within the regulator’s competence. Table 2 below provides 
evidence on indicators of regulatory independence and regulatory competence in 15 EU 
member states. The data, obtained from Copenhagen Economics, is derived from a detailed 
examination of the national regulatory legislation on national regulators and the resources 
made available to them. It had been used in the reports commissioned by the Internal Market 
Directorate-General of the European Commission (Copenhagen Economics, 2005).  
 
The regulatory independence indicator is constructed by taking the simple average of the 
scores for a number of sub-indicators, which consist of: budgetary allowance, number of 
personnel weighted by population, and whether the regulator share power with other 
governmental bodies. Each sub-indicator is assigned a value between 0 and 1, depending on 
the level of independence, relative budget/personnel size, and the extent of power sharing. 
Similarly, the regulatory competence indicator is also the average of the sub-indicators 
measuring the regulator’s competence with respect to regulation of prices for different types 
of consumers and network users, conditions of access to the network, and quality of service. 
For both indicators, a value close to 0 indicates highly limited independence or competence 
whereas a value close to 1 indicates high levels.  
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The evidence in Table 2 paints a mixed picture about regulatory competence and 
independence in the three industries. First, existing NRAs in general do not enjoy a high 
degree of independence, the cross-section average of which is 0.55 for telecommunications, 
followed by 0.54 for gas and 0.49 for electricity. This implies that NRAs, on average, enjoy 
only about half of the level of independence that a fully-fledged regulator is expected to enjoy. 
Therefore, NRAs face a risk of regulatory capture, as predicted by ‘commission inadequacy’ 
theory of regulation. 
 
(Table 2 here). 
 
Secondly, the evidence suggests that there is a high degree of variation between NRA 
independence across member states. The coefficient of variation is highest for the gas industry 
regulators (at 43.61%) followed by electricity regulators (at 41.72%). In the 
telecommunications industry, there is a higher degree of convergence as reflected by the low 
value for the coefficient of variation at 16.64%. The implication here is that further 
coordination is needed to encourage the adoption of best practice with respect to regulatory 
independence in gas and electricity industries. 
 
The third observation relates to the scope of regulatory competence. On average, NRAs tend 
to have competence in only about one-third to 50% of the full range of competence areas. The 
level of regulatory competence is highest in the telecommunications industry (at 0.57) and 
lowest in the gas industry (at 0.32.). In addition, the extent of variation between regulatory 
competences of the NRAs is highest in the gas industry (at 65.99%) and lowest in the 
electricity and telecommunications industries (at 23.24% and 22.43%, respectively). The 
implication here is that member states with low regulatory competence are likely to have a 
dampening effect on the development of regulatory competence in the rest of the EU due to 
the artificial competitive edge that low regulatory competence provides.  
 
What is also significant is the extent of correlation between the levels of regulatory 
independence and competence across EU-15 countries. A high level of correlation between 
the two ex ante indicators would suggest that NRAs, across EU-15, are equipped with the 
resources that are commensurate with the range of regulatory competences they have. A low 
level of correlation, on the other hand, would indicate that the level of resources is either too 
high or too low compared to the range of regulatory competences. We have calculated the 
Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient for the two indicators in 2003 – the latest year for 
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which data is available. The results indicate that the estimated coefficients are very low (0.118 
and 0.139 for electricity and gas regulators, respectively) and not statistically significant at 
5%. In telecommunications, the correlation coefficient is 0.587 and it is statistically 
significant. Even though this correlation is not strong, it distinguishes the telecommunications 
regulators from gas and electricity regulators where there is evident mismatch between 
independence and regulatory competence across EU-15. There are two types of anomalies that 
cause mismatch between regulatory competence and independence or vice versa.  
 
The first type of anomaly concerns high levels of independence combined with low levels of 
competence. This is evident in the case of electricity regulators in Austria and the UK, with 
significant levels of independence (0.64 and 0.74, respectively) but relatively limited 
competence (0.26 and 0.57, respectively). In the gas industry, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden display similar anomalies. In the case of 
telecommunications, Finland falls into the same category. These discrepancies suggest that 
NRAs in these countries/industries tend to have high levels of independence, but this 
independence is not deployed across a wide range of regulatory competences. The implication 
here is that regulators in these countries/industries may be effective in regulating a limited 
number of market outcomes, but this effectiveness is obtained at a cost of weak or ineffective 
regulation with respect to other outcomes. 
 
The second type of anomaly is the mirror image of the first: low independence coupled with 
high levels of regulatory competence. The French and Spanish regulators in the electricity 
industry, the Spanish regulator in the gas industry, and the French and the Dutch regulators in 
the telecommunications industry fall into this category. The implication for regulatory quality 
here is that these regulators are either not independent of the government or they spread their 
powers too thinly over a large number of regulatory targets. In any case, their regulatory 
decisions are likely to be open to the risk of capture either by the industry or by the 
government. 
 
2.3 Transparency 
 
The third ex ante indicator relates to transparency requirements that regulated firms must 
comply with in their pricing strategies and access provision. Transparency is necessary for 
enabling end-users or other users to choose between different retail suppliers or network 
operators. It is also necessary to monitor the performance of the regulator in terms of its effect 
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on firm behaviour. In this section, we examine only the first type of transparency as the 
second type can be measured only ex post.  Data availability limits the exercise to the 
electricity and gas industries, the transparency indicators of which are provided in Table 4 
below. 
 
The index in Table 3 is derived from NRA responses to a questionnaire sent by ERGEG. It is 
constructed as follows: for each transparency criterion specified by ERGEG, we assign a 
value of 1 if the response from the NRA confirms transparency; a value between 0.25 - 0.75 if 
the answer is qualified; and a value of 0 if the answer confirms no transparency. The 
transparency index in the last column is the national average across the transparency criteria; 
whereas the index in the last row of the table is the EU average across member states for each 
transparency criteria. The transparency criteria (C1-C7) are described in the note under the 
table.  
 
(Table 3 here). 
 
The table shows that no member state satisfies the condition of full transparency with respect 
to all criteria. Similarly, no single criterion is satisfied by all member states. In addition, 
ERGEG (2005) explicitly states that NRAs did not provide detailed information about how 
transparency is ensured when they report that this is the case. In other words, the index is 
actually too generous a measure of transparency. Despite this, the overall level of 
transparency is 0.56 - with large range of overall variation from 0.11 to 0.89 between 
countries. The range of overall variation is smaller (from 0.42 to 0.77) between transparency 
criteria, but this should be considered in the light of two additional observations. First, the 
lowest level of transparency (0.42) is observed in C7, which measures the comparability of 
published prices. This implies that EU-15 gas and electricity companies, as of 2005, 
introduced and maintained a high level of noise into their price information, and the national 
regulators were least effective in this area. Secondly, the highest transparency score is 
observed in C1 – publication of price lists. This suggests that regulators have been successful 
in forcing the regulated gas and electricity companies to publish price information, but this 
information does not lend itself to effective price comparison. 
 
According to ERGEG (2005: 5), lack of transparency benefits incumbents, undermines the 
position of new entrants, and aggravates consumer mistrust in the price formation mechanism. 
That is why EU Commission (2007: 8) reports that all network users demand more 
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transparency and that there is little harmonisation between member-state transparency 
requirements. These official evaluations confirm the low levels of the transparency index we 
present in Table 3 and enable us to conclude that NRAs regulating the electricity and gas 
industries do not yet satisfy the transparency condition for effective regulation.  
 
The evidence presented so far is by no means exhaustive, however it provides some useful 
insights into the extent to which the emerging regulatory regime in EU-15 satisfies the ex ante 
conditions for minimising the risk of regulatory failure. On the one hand, the emerging 
regulatory regime is in line with the normative implications of the economic theory of 
regulation as it combines national and EU-level regulatory frameworks. This design reduces 
the risk of excessively lenient regulation, but it is compromised by extensive bargaining and 
compromises that characterise the EU decision-making process. On the other hand, the 
emerging regime combines both strong and weak national regulators in terms of regulatory 
competence and independence. This mixture may be interpreted as a reflection of transition 
towards more convergence across member states. However, and until such convergence 
occurs by moving towards higher standards, the existing arrangements are essentially sub-
optimal. This is due to relatively low levels of regulatory competence and independence as 
well as to mismatch between the two.   
 
 
3.  Ex post indicators of regulatory quality and outcomes  
 
In this section, we examine evidence on market outcomes that can be associated with the 
effectiveness of regulation in EU network industries. We begin with the market opening index 
(MOI), which measures the extent of liberalisation in the relevant industry as of 2003. The 
MOI is calculated as an index between 0 (not open) and 1 (fully open) on the basis of legal 
and actual arrangements in place with respect to: (i) unbundling of transmission and 
distribution system operators; (ii) third-party access to distribution, transmission and storage 
infrastructure; and (iii) the degree of free choice of supplier. The data for MOI is obtained 
from Copenhagen Economics Market Opening Milestones database. Descriptive statistics for 
the MOI over the 1990-2003 period are as follows: in the gas sector, the EU-15 average of the 
MOI was 0.14 and the coefficient of variation was 134%; in the electricity and 
telecommunications sectors, respectively, the corresponding figures were 0.25 and 0.25 for 
the MOI average, and 84% and 97% for the coefficient of variation. As of 2003, the EU-15 
average of MOI was 0.54 for gas, 0.67 for electricity, and 0.72 for telecommunications; with 
 13 
corresponding coefficients of variation at 187% for gas, 68% for electricity, and 49% for 
telecommunications.  
 
 
3.1 Regulatory independence/competence and market opening 
 
In the initial stage of liberalisation, we would expect regulatory competence and 
independence to increase in line with the level of market opening (i.e., liberalisation). This is 
because liberalisation of network industries constitutes a move from a state-owned monopoly 
towards an oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive market that requires effective 
regulation. Therefore, theoretically, we expect a high degree of cross-section correlation 
between the level of market opening on the one hand and the levels of regulatory 
independence/competence on the other. To verify whether this is the case, we use the 
regulatory independence/competence indicators presented in Table 2 and the market opening 
index (MOI) summarised above. To reflect the significance of the length of time over which 
market opening has reached a certain threshold (0.3), we multiplied the national MOI in 2003 
with the number of years over which market opening was 0.3 or greater in that member states.  
 
The findings (not tabulated here due to space limitations), suggests that the coefficients of 
correlation between the weighted MOI and regulatory independence/competence are rather 
low (between - 0.08 and 0.33 for the MOI/Independence correlation and between 0.11 and 
0.60 for the MOI/Competence correlation) and statistically not significant – with the 
exception of the gas industry. In the latter, the coefficient is 0.6 and it is statistically 
significant at 10% level. These findings enable us to argue that the cross-country data for 
2003 does not indicate a statistically significant correlation between the level of liberalisation 
and regulatory institution building. This could be either because regulatory institution 
building has been lagging behind the level of liberalisation or vice versa. Irrespective of 
which is the case, it is safe to conclude that there is a high degree of arbitrariness in the way 
in which the European regulatory framework has been taking shape over the last decade. The 
gas industry is the exception that proves the rule: we observe a relatively high (0.60) and 
statistically significant degree of correlation in this industry because both the weighted MOI 
and the level of regulatory competence in this industry are low!  
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3.2 Regulatory indicators, competition and prices 
 
Over time, effective network industry regulation can be expected to induce a higher level of 
competition, leading to lower prices as a result of reduced concentration and collusive 
behaviour. Formally, the impact of regulation-induced competition on prices can be stated as 
follows (MacAvoy, 2007: 9-10):  
 
(PQ - ΣCi Qi ) / PQ = HHI (1 + v) / e.   (Eq. 1) 
Where: 
P = industry price    Q =  industry output Ci = firm i’s variable cost per unit 
Qi = firm i’s outptut   e = demand elasticity  
HHI= Herfindahl-Hirschman index (sum of squares of market shares of firms in the industry, 
takes values between 0 and 1) 
v = conjectural variation index (a measure of collusive/coordinated behaviour, which can be 
smaller, equal or greater than zero).   
 
The left hand side of the equation is the price-cost margin at equilibrium, measured as 
proportion of industry revenue. Assuming that demand elasticity is constant, the right hand 
side of the equation suggests that the price-cost margin will fall if the concentration level 
(HHI) and extent of collusive behaviour (v) falls. Table 4 below provides some evidence on 
network industry price indices over time - with 1997 as the base period. 
  
(Table 4 here). 
 
Table 4 suggests that prices in the telecommunications industry has fallen significantly over 
time and in comparison with the level of inflation (the harmonised index of consumer prices – 
HICP) in EU15. This is in line with the expected effect of regulation. The average price index 
for electricity reflects a less clear-cut trend. It tended to fall until 2002, but started to increase 
from 2003 onwards. Nevertheless, both price indices (households and industrial customers) 
for electricity have remained below the HICP index throughout the period. This is also in line 
with the expected effect of regulation, but the evidence is less clear-cut than the 
telecommunications sector for 3 reasons. First, the fall in the price index has occurred before 
the introduction of the regulatory reform package at the EU level; (ii) the increase in the price 
index, however, occurred from 2003 onwards when regulatory effectiveness was expected to 
increase as a result of EU-level coordination; and (iii) Equation 1 above indicates that the fall 
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in price levels should be substantive and continuous until the concentration ratio and the level 
of strategic collusion have been reduced to levels compatible with effective competition.  
 
In contrast to electricity and telecommunications, price indices for gas have increased over 
time and relative to the HICP index despite the fact that the market opening reforms in this 
industry began at the same time as electricity. Explanations of the increase in gas prices 
include the following: (i) indexation of gas prices to oil prices; (ii) supply bottlenecks caused 
by network capacity; (iii) significant market power enjoyed by incumbents; and (iv) long 
durations of sale/purchase contracts. (ERGEG, 2006; EU Commission, 2007).  Therefore, 
excluding the impact of other factors that may affect price levels, we can conclude that 
regulation has been associated with significant decline in telephony prices, had an uncertain 
effect on electricity prices, and failed to dampen the price increases in the gas sector.  
 
Another way in which we can try to establish if association exists between regulation and 
price levels is to look at coefficients of correlation between prices and regulatory quality 
indicators across member states. Table 5 below provides the correlation coefficients for 
regulatory indicators and retail price indices for electricity, gas and telecommunications.  The 
regulatory indicators are the independence and competence indicators presented in Table 2 
above. The retail price indices (RPIs) are adjusted by taking: (i) the difference between 
industry price index and the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP); and (ii) the ratio of 
the industry price index to HICP. For RPI as well as HICP, the base year is 1997.  
 
(Table 5 here). 
 
 
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that only two coefficients of correlation are 
statistically significant at 10% level: the coefficients of correlation between regulatory 
competence in the telecommunications industry and the adjusted RPI for national calls. In 
addition, these coefficients have the ‘correct’ (i.e., negative) sign, indicating that an increase 
in regulatory competence is associated with price falls across member states. The remaining 
22 coefficients are statistically insignificant and 8 of them have incorrect (i.e. positive) signs. 
Given these results, it is possible to conclude that, with the possible exception of national call 
prices, the levels of regulatory activity in 2003 were not associated with lower gas, electricity 
or telephone call prices in 2005.  
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One reason for these results is that independence and competence of NRAs are distributed 
unequally across EU-15 and they tend to be around only 50-60% of fully effective levels – as 
indicated in Table 2 above. In addition, some member states such as the UK, Sweden, and 
Austria have had independent NRAs for gas and electricity since mid-1990s. These regulators 
have either advisory or concurrent powers shared with national competition authorities (EU 
Commission, 2005b: 22). Some others such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the 
UK have also had well-established NRAs in the telecommunications industry. However, in 
the rest of the EU-15, NRAs are either not independent of the government or do not have 
advisory or concurrent powers with the national competition authorities. In addition, the 
European Commission has so far had to maintain a lenient approach to competition issues in 
network industries. For example, it has taken only 16 actions against infringement of 
competition rules from 2003-2007. Also, it has prohibited only 2 out of 439 network industry 
mergers and acquisitions that have taken place between 1995-2005 (EU Commission, 2007a: 
54). Given the absence of conjunction between competition and regulation authorities and the 
relative weakness of the latter, it is not surprising to observe that the association between ex 
ante regulatory indicators and ex post outcomes such as price levels is very weak and 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Another reason relates to persistent market concentration and the ability of the incumbents to 
manipulate prices. According EU Commission (2005a and 2006), the gas and electricity 
markets remain concentrated and create scope for incumbents to influence prices. In addition, 
many wholesale markets are illiquid either due to long term contracts (gas) or because 
companies are active both in production and in the retail markets (electricity). Finally, the 
lack of transparency aggravates mistrust in the price formation mechanisms in the retail and 
wholesale markets. These indicators of distortions to competition are confirmed by ERGEG 
(2006), which highlight the tendency to ‘nurture European champions’ through cross-border 
mergers. According to ERGEG these mergers may well lead to future market dominance - 
despite or perhaps because of recent developments towards market integration. National 
regulators ‘are unable to effectively monitor cross-border unbundling.’ Therefore, a single 
company operating in one country may own subsidiaries in another country and operate its 
network with a view to benefit the subsidiaries.   
ERGEG (2006: 7) also indicates that NRA reports for the gas and electricity markets contain 
‘alarming cases where regulators have increasingly had to coordinate decisions with political 
decision- makers’. In other cases, governments have been able to overrule decisions taken by 
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the regulators – ‘setting returns on capital or giving direct instructions to the board of 
directors of the regulator.’  ERGEG had already drawn attention to these problems in its 2005 
report, however the situation has deteriorated over the year. The main reason is that rising 
energy prices and tighter capacities have been used to justify intervention into a market that is 
perceived not to deliver secure supply at low prices. However, this intervention is carried out 
not through regulators but through political discretion. This is a recipe not only to undermine 
the authority/credibility of the regulators but also to induce the latter to be lenient towards the 
regulated. 
 
The exception is telecommunications, but even in this industry competition has been 
constrained due to dominant position of the incumbents in fixed telephony and oligopolistic 
competition in mobile telephony. While the number of major players increased in the majority 
of EU15, it was reduced in France and Sweden. Nevertheless, market developments in the 
telecommunications sector have been in the direction of moving away from vertical 
integration and the average market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications has 
fallen from 100% at the start of liberalisation to approximately 65% in 2005 (EU Commission, 
2007a). 
 
3.3 Regulation and consumer switching 
The extent of switching between suppliers is a significant indicator of the scope for 
competition. Tables 6 below provide information on this indicator in the electricity and gas 
markets (gas market figures are in parenthesis). Switching data is not available for 
telecommunications.  
(Table 6 here). 
 
In the electricity market, there are 5 member states where about 50% of the large industrial 
users have switched from one supplier to the other since market opening. These are Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK.   In the remaining member states that have reported 
switching data, the rate for large industrial users ranged between about 10 - 35 per cent. 
Despite the variation, the evidence indicates a significant level of switching activity by large 
users of electricity. However, the rate of switching is very low among small commercial and 
household users – with the exception of the UK (50% since market opening), The Netherlands 
(35%) and Belgium (19%). In fact, in some member states switching between suppliers is 
either not allowed or has been introduced only recently. A similar trend is observable in the 
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gas industry too: in only two member states (Italy and the UK) was the rate of switching 
significant (35% to 50%) among large as well as small users.  
 
 
4.  Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the quality of regulation tends to report pessimistic 
findings. Regulators, in contrast to declared intentions, tend to remain ineffective in reducing the 
price-cost margins of companies in oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive markets. 
Although there are variations in the findings about the extent of regulatory failure, these variations 
are about the degree of regulatory failure - and not about whether failure does occur.  
 
The evidence analysed above enables us to verify the extent to which the emerging regulatory 
regime in EU network industries has been designed in a manner that would minimise the risk of 
regulatory failure highlighted in work on other cases. On the positive side, we have established 
that the co-existence of EU- and national-level legislation and regulatory bodies is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for reducing the risk of regulatory failure. In addition, we have 
established that there is scope for the diffusion of best regulatory practice through the 
coordination and cooperation activities of the EU-level regulatory bodies such as ERG and 
ERGEG.  
 
On the negative side, however, we have identified a large number of ex ante and ex post indicators 
that suggest that the emerging European regulatory regime is less than optimal. The ex ante 
indicators of regulatory independence and competence suggest that NRAs are highly unequal 
across countries and that there is significant discrepancy between regulatory independence and 
competence in each member state. In addition, the level of transparency with respect to price and 
network access is inadequate in the gas and electricity markets, even though we do not have data 
for the telecommunications market. The ex post indicators demonstrate that, with the exception of 
national calls in the telecommunications sector, there is no statistically significant correlation 
between indictors of regulatory independence/competence on the one hand and the level of market 
opening or prices on the other. This lack of correlation suggests that the 
independence/competence of NRAs is not commensurate with the level of market opening at the 
national level. Therefore, and not surprisingly, the independence/competence of NRAs is not a 
good predictor of the price level or degree of competition in member states. Finally, we have also 
established that a decade of market opening and regulation has not led to high levels of switching 
among small users of electricity and gas – even though non-availability of data has prevented us 
from assessing the switching rate in the telecommunications industry.  
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One policy implication that can be derived from the analysis above is that it is necessary to invoke 
competition rules against anti-competitive behaviour by firms and against member states that fail 
to transpose EU regulations and directives into national legislation – especially in the gas and 
electricity markets. There are signs indicating movement in that direction. In its network 
industries evaluation report for 2006, the Commission reports that it has taken 16 actions against 
member states/firms in the gas and electricity sectors (EU Commission, 2007a). This is a small 
number but it signals to the possibility of increased future activism, which may help address the 
deficiencies of the national regulatory regimes. Yet it must be viewed against the background of 
two adverse tendencies. First, the level of national mergers and take-overs (70% of aggregate 
value and 75% of total numbers) that may reduce the contestability of the national markets has 
been much higher than that of cross-border mergers and take-overs (30% and 25%, respectively) 
that may increase the contestability of national markets. Secondly, the rate of prohibiting mergers 
on competition grounds has been quite low – only 0.5% between 1995-2005 (EU Commission, 
2007a: 51-54). 
 
The other policy implication is related to the first and points to the need to increase the powers of 
EU-level regulators such as ERG and ERGEG. Indeed, the Commission has made a move in that 
direction by adopting on 19 September 2007 a third package of legislative proposals, which 
provides, inter alia, for the establishment of a new Agency for the Cooperation of National Energy 
Regulators (ACER). The package was approved by the European Parliament on 19 September 
2007 and the Council adopted a common position on 9 January 2009, with a view to endorse the 
package by December 2009. Under the new package, ACER will be funded from the EU budget 
and will have the power to take binding decisions – unlike ERGEG which acts mainly as a 
platform for voluntary coordination based on the principle of ‘comply or explain’. The European 
Commission also put forward similar proposals for telecommunications regulation in November 
2007, but these proposals have not yet been discussed or approved by the European Parliament or 
the Council.  Given these developments, it can be conjectured that the increase in the competence 
and independence of the EU-level regulator may reduce the risks of regulatory failures examined 
above. However, in the electricity and gas sectors, it will take a long time for the European 
Commission and the member states to strike a bargain about the specific powers of ACER and 
how much of the NRAs’ powers should be transferred to it. It will take an even longer time to 
observe any change in the telecommunications sector.  
 
 20 
References 
Bernstein, M. (1955), Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Berry, W. D. (1982), ‘Theories of Regulatory Impact: The Roles of the Regulator, the Regulated and 
the Public’, Policy Studies Review, 4, 2, 436-441. 
Coen, D. and C. Doyle, 2000, ‘Liberalisation of Utilities and Evolving European Regulation’, 
Economic Outlook, 24, 3, 18-26.  
Copenhagen Economics (2005), Market Opening in Network Industries: Parts I and II, Report no. 
6201 for DG Internal Market, September 2005, Copenhagen, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/economic-reports/docs/2005/part_i_final_report_en.pdf (for Part 1) 
and http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/economic-reports/docs/2005/part_ii_sectoral_analyses_en.pdf 
(for Part 2). February 2007. 
Dal Bo, E. (2006), ‘Regulatory Capture: A Review’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22, 2, 203-
225. 
 
Eberlein, B. and A. L. Newman (2008), ‘Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? 
Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union’, Governance, 21, 1, 25–52. 
ERGEG (2005) (European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas), Report on Transparency of 
Energy Prices, Bills and Contracts, Ref: E05-CFG-02-07, September, http://www.ceer-
eu.org/portal/page/portal/ERGEG_HOME/ERGEG. March 2007. 
ERGEG (2006) (European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas), Assessment of the Development 
of the European Energy Market, E06-MOR-02-03, December, http://www.ceer-
eu.org/portal/page/portal/ERGEG_HOME/ERGEG. March 2007.  
Estache, A. and D. Martimort (1999), ‘Politics, Transaction Costs and the Design of Regulatory 
Institutions’, World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, no. 2073. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1999/04/20/000094946_990326045
81622/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf , February 2007.  
EU Commission (2005a), Evaluation of the Performance of the Network Industries Providing Services 
of General Economic Interest, SEC(2005) 1781, 20.12.2005, Brussels. 
EU Commission (2005b), Technical Annex to Report on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity 
Internal Market, SEC(2004)/1720, 5.1.2005, Brussels 
EU Commission (2006), Inquiry Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the 
European Gas and Electricity Sectors, COM(2006) 851.  
EU Commission (2007), Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC(2006) 1724, 10.1.2007, Brussels. 
EU Commission (2007a), Evaluation of the Performance of Network Industries Providing Services of 
General Economic Interest (2006 Report), European Economy, 2007, no. 1. 
Eurostat (1), Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) Database, 
http://nui.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=prc_hicp_aind&lang=en . April 2007 
Eurostat (2), Consumer price statistics, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=0,1136173,0_45570701&_dad=portal&_schema
=PORTAL. April 2007 
 21 
Frankfurter, F. (1930), The Public and its Government, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Geradin, D. 2006, ‘The Liberalization of Network Industries in the European Union: Where Do We 
Come From and Where Do We Go’, Annual Report of the European Regulation for Electricity and 
Gas, Prime Minister’s Office, Economic Council of Finland, September 2006. 
Heritier, A. (2001), ‘Market Integration and Social Cohesion: The Politics of Public Services in 
European Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 5, 825-852. 
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Laffont, J. J. and D. Martimort (1999), ‘Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behaviour’, 
RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 2, 232-262. 
Majone, G. (2000), ‘The Credibility Crisis of the Community Regulation’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 38, 2, 273-302. 
Majone, G. (2002), ‘Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity’, European Law Journal, 8, 3, 
319-339. 
MacAvoy, P.W. (2007), The Unsustainable Costs of Partial Deregulation, New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press. 
Mitra, A., D. Stoler and Lin, T-C (2005), ‘Deregulation of the Electric Utility Industry: An Empirical 
Study’, Public Finance and Management, 5, 3, 439-453. 
Napolitano, G. (2005), ‘Towards a European Legal Order for Services of General Economic Interest’, 
European Public Law, 11, 4, 565-581. 
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Peltzman, S. (1976), ‘Towards a More General Theory of Regulation’ Journal of Law and Economics, 
19, 2, 211-240 . 
Stigler, G.J. (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2, 1, 3-21. 
Tirole, J. (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organisations’, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 19, 3, pp. 19-42. 
Trachsel, H. H. (1950), Public Utility Regulation, Chicago: Richard D. Irwin Publishers. 
Upadhyaya, K.P. and F. G. Mixon Jr. (1995), ‘Regulatory Capture and the Price of Electricity: 
Evidence from Time Series Estimates’, International Journal of Social Economics, 22, 1, 16-23. 
Upadhyaya, K.P. and J. E. Raymond (1994), ‘What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity 
Revisited’, Department of Economics, Auburn University, Auburn, AL. 
 
Wilson, J. Q. (1974), ‘The Politics of Regulation’ in J. W. McKie (ed.), Social Responsibility and 
Business Predicament, Washington: Brookings, 135-168. 
 22 
Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Minimising transaction costs through regulatory design 
 
Sources of transaction costs Adverse effects 
 
To minimise the adverse effects: 
Conflict between 
commitment and ex post 
efficiency: incompleteness of 
the regulatory contract makes 
periodic renegotiations 
necessary and/or efficient. 
Prospect of renegotiations induces 
the firm to under-invest in specific 
assets in period 1 and chooses 
inefficient technology to 
manipulate the regulator’s beliefs 
about its performance in period 2. 
 
• Create independent regulatory 
bodies to improve commitment; 
• Combine commitment rules with 
rules for fine-tuning. 
 
Multiple agency problems in 
government: competition 
between departments and 
bureaucracies for distribution 
of regulatory rights and rents. 
 
Sub-optimal regulation due to 
multiplicity of regulators: 
excessive regulation when 
regulated activities are 
complementary; inadequate 
regulation when activities are 
substitutes. 
 
 
• Optimise the number of 
regulatory bodies with 
complementary competences; 
• Improve information through 
benchmarking; 
• Enable regulators to share 
information; 
• Make regulators accountable to a 
single elected authority. 
 
Politicians tend to maximise 
welfare of median voter 
rather than social welfare. 
 
Politicians design sub-optimal 
regulatory contracts that maximise 
favours from the regulated 
industry. 
 
• Establish regulatory bodies with 
board structure – to resolve 
representation problems; 
• Increase accountability of the 
political principal. 
 
Regulators strike side 
contracts with regulated firms 
with a view to share rents. 
 
With too much discretion and 
autonomy, regulators try to 
maximise regulatory rents; with 
too little discretion and autonomy, 
regulators tend to prefer the status 
quo.  
 
• Increase accountability of the 
regulator; 
• Increase information on the 
regulator’s performance; 
• Introduce collusion-proof 
constraints – e.g. performance 
incentives coupled with banning 
future employment of regulator in 
regulated industries. 
 
Source: Estache and Martimort (1999: 22). 
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Table 2: Indicators of regulatory independence (IND) and competence (COMP) - 2003 
 
 NRAs in Electricity NRAs in Gas NRAs in Telecomms. 
 IND  COMP IND COMP IND COMP 
Austria 0.64 0.26 0.73 0.39 0.54 0.56 
Belgium 0.66 0.61 0.86 0.48 0.61 0.72 
Denmark 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.33 0.72 0.70 
Finland 0.49 0.40 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.35 
France 0.28 0.51 0.46 0.27 0.39 0.43 
Germany 0.04 0.43 0.00 0.22 0.65 0.80 
Greece 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.00 0.57 0.58 
Ireland 0.76 0.62 0.94 0.47 0.57 0.60 
Italy 0.42 0.48 0.40 0.61 0.53 0.63 
Luxemburg 0.48 0.36 0.51 0.29 0.67 0.53 
The N/lands 0.43 0.46 0.40 0.51 0.40 0.53 
Portugal 0.69 0.36 0.54 0.00 0.55 0.45 
Spain 0.25 0.60 0.29 0.45 0.59 0.70 
Sweden 0.61 0.50 0.67 0.14 0.46 0.40 
UK 0.74 0.57 0.69 0.58 0.49 0.56 
EU-15 
Average 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.32 0.55 0.57 
Coefficient of 
variation (%) 41.72 23.24 43.61 65.99 16.64 22.43 
 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Market Opening Milestones Database. 
Regulatory independence (IND): simple average of scores (between 0 and 1) for budgetary allowance, number 
of personnel weighted by population, and extent of power sharing with governmental bodies 
Regulatory competence (COMP): simple average of scores (between 0 and 1) for regulation of prices for 
different types of consumers and network users, conditions of access to the network, and quality of service 
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Table 3: Price transparency indices derived from NRA responses for gas and electricity - 2005 
        Transparency  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 Index Average 
Spain  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.11 
Sweden  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 
France  1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.32 
Portugal  0.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.32 
Ireland  0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.43 
Italy  1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Finland  1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.68 
Austria  1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71 
Greece  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 
Netherlands  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.82 
Belgium  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.89 
Great Britain  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.89 
EU-12 Average  0.77 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.42 0.56 
Source: Derived from NRA answers in ERGEG (2005: 14, 15, 18). 
 
Transparency index:  
1.00 = full transparency;  0.25 to 0.75 = incomplete transparency;   0 = no transparency 
Transparency criteria: 
C1: Publication of list price is required (by default supplier) 
C2: Publication of offer price is required (by new supplier or when moving to a different tariff)  
C3: Does every supplier publish prices or just the incumbent? 
C4: Does supplier provide price information to the regulator or another body? 
C5: When are prices published: before or after the price change? 
C6: How can a customer compare prices: platform for information and who provides it? 
C7: Is comparability of prices ensured?   
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Table 4: Network industry price indices: EU-15 average prices; 1997 = 100 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Telecommunications Price Indices  
1997=100 (Euro per 10 min call) 
   
Local calls price index: EU-15  100.0 107.0 105.4 104.3 105.9 102.0 102.5 100.5 97.1 
National calls price index EU 15 100.0 82.8 69.0 53.8 40.7 36.9 35.7 31.1 29.2 
Electricity prices indices  
1997=100 (Euro per kWh)  
      
Electricity household price index 100.0 99.0 97.1 95.9 96.9 98.0 101.3 102.9 105.1 
Electricity industrial price index 100.0 98.0 95.2 94.2 94.5 94.9 102.1 98.5 105.5 
Gas prices indices 
1997=100 (Euro per Gigajoule) 
      
Gas household price index 100.0 101.4 95.0 102.9 127.9 121.7 123.4 121.1 133.8 
Gas industrial price index 100.0 96.3 82.1 103.3 152.2 134.6 137.8 133.7 152.3 
HICP,  EU 15, 1997=100 100.0 101.3 102.5 104.4 106.7 109.0 111.1 113.3 115.7 
 
Source: Eurostat (2). 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for regulatory indicators in 2003 and relative price index (RPI) in 
2005 
 
RPI 
 
Reg. Indicator 
Electricity: 
industrial 
users RPI 
Electricity: 
households 
RPI 
Gas: 
industrial 
users RPI 
Gas: 
households 
RPI 
Telecoms: 
local calls 
RPI 
Telecoms: 
national 
calls RPI 
Independence 
of Electricity 
Regulators  
0.021 
(0.019) 
N = 15 
0.166 
(0.146) 
N = 15 
    
Competence of 
Electricity 
Regulators 
-0.04 
(-0.009) 
N = 15 
-0.147 
(-0.163) 
N = 15 
    
Independence 
of Gas 
Regulators 
  0.075 
(0.080) 
N = 12 
-0.181 
(-0.183) 
N = 13 
  
Competence of 
Gas Regulators 
  -0.154 
(-0.164) 
N = 12 
-0.117 
(-0.139) 
N = 13 
  
Independence 
of Telecoms 
Regulators 
    0.095 
(0.104) 
N = 15 
-0.204 
(-0.196) 
N = 14 
Competence of  
Telecoms 
Regulators 
    -0.003 
(-0.006) 
N = 15 
-0.497* 
(-0.529)* 
N = 14 
* = statistically significant at 10% level. 
RPI = Retail price index, 1997 = 100. 
N = Number of countries for which full data is available 
Top entry: coefficients of correlation when price adjustment is the difference between RPI and HICP in 
2005. 
Bottom entry (in brackets): coefficients of correlation when price adjustment is the ratio of RPI to HICP 
in 2005. 
Source: Eurostat(1) and Copenhagen Economics. 
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Table 6: Switching estimates - Electricity and (Gas) 
 Large industrial users  Small commercial/domestic users 
 
Since market 
opening  
During 
2003 
Since market 
opening  During 2003 
Austria  22% (9%) 7% (9%) 3% (0.5%) 1% (0.5%) 
Belgium  35% (60%) 8% (n.a) 19% (4%) 19% (4%) 
Denmark 50% (30%) 22% (3%) 5% (n.a) 5% (n.a) 
Finland 50% (n.k) 16% (n.k) n.k (n.k) 4% (n.k) 
France  22% (25%) n.k (5%) n.a (n.a) n.a (n.a) 
Germany 35% (7%) n.k (n.k.) 6% (<2%)) n.k (0%) 
Greece 0% (n.k) 0% (n.k) n.a (n.k) n.a (n.k) 
Ireland 50% (>50%) 6% (1%) 1% (n.a) 1% (n.a) 
Italy  c.15% (30%) n.k (n.k) n.a (35%) n.a (35%) 
Luxembourg 10% (<5%) n.k (n.k) n.a (n.a) n.a (n.a) 
Netherlands  30% (30%) n.k (n.k) 35% (2%) n.k (n.k) 
Portugal 9% (n.k) 7% (n.k) 1% (n.k) 1% (n.k) 
Spain  18% (>50%) 5% (22%) 0% (5%) 0% (5%) 
Sweden 50% (n.k) 5% (n.k) n.k (n.a) 10% (n.a) 
UK 50% (>50%) n.k (19%) 50% (47%) 22% (13%) 
Source: EU Commission (2005b: 5, 6) 
n.a.: Not applicable 
n.k. = No information 
 
 
